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1. INTRODUCTION 
Rights management systems and laws designed to protect these 
systems from circumvention occupy an increasingly central role in 
increasingly heated discussions about online copyright enforcement. 
Proponents argue that without these systems and laws, there is no 
possibility of meaningful copyright enforcement online. Opponents 
contend that the emerging technical and legal regimes for digital rights 
management threaten copyright's traditional balance of rights and 
limitations and are inconsistent with the preservation and growth of a 
vibrant public domain. Without disclaiming the views we have 
previously stated on those matters, I we would like to ask some rather 
different questions. Thus far, the debate about rights management 
systems has taken them as given - that is, it has taken decisions about 
their design as variables exogenous to the policy process. We would 
like to question this assumption. Can rights management systems be 
designed and implemented in a way that preserves the traditional 
copyright balance? If so, how might the law encourage this? Should 
the law do so? 
. 
hi this paper, we consider whether rights management systems can 
be supported l?y legal and institutional infrastructures that enable 
appropriate public access to the works secured by these technologies. 
We focus primarily on the design challenges posed by the fair use 
doctrine, which historically has played a central role in preserving such 
access. Throughout the paper, however, we also use the term "fair 
use" to refer more generally to the variety of limiting doctrines ,vithin 
copyright law that serve this goal. We begin in Part IT by reviewing the 
contours of the fair use doctrine and the legal and policy requirements 
that mandate appropriate public access to copyrighted works and other 
publicly available informational works. Part ill discusses the nature and 
1. Dan L Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L REv. 121, 168-76 
(1999) [hereinafter Muddy Rules]; Dan L Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse (manuscript 
on file with author) [hereinafter Anticircumvention Misuse]; Julie E. Cohen, Copyright 
and the Perfect Curve, 53 V AND. L. REv. 1799 (2000) [hereinafter Perfect Curve]; Julie 
E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. W. 1089 
(1998) [hereinafter Self-Help]; Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New 
Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management", 97 MICH. L REv. 462 (1998) 
[hereinafter Lochner in Cyberspace]; Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright 
Management Systems and Laws Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. W. 
161 (1997) [hereinafter Reflections]; Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: 
A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L REv. 981 
(1996) [hereinafter Cohen, Read Anonymously]. 
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purpose of rights management systems, their legal status under the 
current anti-circumvention provisions of u.s. law, and their likely 
effects on fair use. In Part N, we consider the foreseeable technical 
and institutional options that might enable proper public access to 
secured works and offer a proposal combining minimum system 
flexibility requirements in exchange for copyright enforcement and "key 
escrow" in exchange for anti-circumvention protection. Part V 
assesses the legal feasibility of such a system and concludes that the 
proposal comports with the United States' obligations under 
international copyright agreements. Finally, Part VI considers whether 
implementation of the proposal would represent good policy and 
concludes that it may be the best realistic alternative for preserving fair 
use in the digital age. 
II. THE SOCIAL FuNCTIONS OF FAIR USE 
Fair use perfonns a variety of rel~ted functions within the policy 
framework of copyright law. First, the Supreme Court has identified 
fair use as a type of "safety valve" that mediates between the strictures 
of copyright and the demands of the First Amendment.2 Copyright is 
a type of restraint on speech: The author's property right in an 
expressive work legally restrains others in their use of that expression. 
Such governmental restraints 011 speech are typically disfavored, yet in 
the case of copyrightable content, the Constitution both allows 
copyright restrictions and disallows governmental interference ,vith free 
expression. Fair use partially reconciles these apparently contradictory 
constitutional provisions by allowing the use of otherwise protected 
material in criticism, comment, parody, news reporting, and similar 
uses in the public interest. 3 This arrangement preserves proprietary 
rights in creative works while accommodating the public interest in 
open dialogue, deliberation, and the advance of knowledge.4 Other 
doctrines within copyright, most notably the so-called "idea-expression 
distinction," also perfonn this function.s 
2. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 
(1985). 
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). 
4. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560. 
5. See id. at 556; 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (1994). Courts and co=entators disagree 
about whether the fair use doctrine and the idea-expression distinction are sufficient to 
reconcile copyright law with the demands of the First Amendment, or whether other 
constraints on copyright are necessruy. See, e.g., Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 
(D.C. Cir. 2001); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment 
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Fair use also has been identified as a device for correcting two 
types of market failure that are likely to occur in the market for 
propertized information created by the Copyright Act. First, fair use 
facilitates worthwhile uses of copyrighted works in instances where the 
value of the use is exceeded by the transaction costs of negotiating a 
license.6 Under such conditions, an unfettered right to exclude might 
deter such valuable uses. The potential user of the work is unlikely to 
spend more to locate the owner and negotiate a license than he can 
recover from the licensed use. The fair use doctrine allows the 
potential user to take the needed portion of the work and make use of 
it without seeking a license, thus enabling uses that would othenvise be 
frustrated. 
But this first type of market failure theory cannot by itself explain 
or justify much of the jurisprudence of fair use. This theory would 
only justify fmding fair use for unauthorized uses of relatively minor 
value only when transaction costs are low; conversely, it would justify 
finding more substantial unauthorized uses to be fair only when 
transaction costs are exceptionally high. Yet the Supreme Court has 
made clear that unauthorized use of a work may be fair even when the 
copyright owner can be located easily and licensing mechanisms are 
available. For example, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,' the 
Court held that unauthorized adaptation of a copyrighted song for 
parody by the rap music group 2 Live Crew might qualify as fair use, 
even though 2 Live Crew had requested, and been refused, a license.8 
Additionally, the 2 Live Crew parody was marketed for profit, which 
suggests that the value of the use to the group outweighed the 
transaction costs of licensing. 
The 2 Live Crew case thus is emblematic of a second type of 
market failure in which the value of socially beneficial uses of 
copyrighted works is not fully intemalized.9 Commentary, criticism, 
Constraints on the Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L REv. 354 (1999); 
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual 
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy 
and Copyright in Our System of Free ExpresSion, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1879 (2000). We 
are not aware of anyone, however, who argues that copyright needs no First 
Amendment safety valve. 
6. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L REv. 1600 (1982). 
7. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
8. [d. at 594. 
9. See Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failure 
and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305 (1993). 
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parody, and other unauthorized uses may be of significant value in 
stimulating public debate and fostering an infonned populace, but this 
value is diffuse and accrues to recipients other than the user of the 
copyrighted work. 10 A certain amount of unregulated private 
noncommercial sharing and copying of works also generates substantial 
but diffuse value, by fueling serendipitous creation and facilitating the 
free flow of ideas within society. II Where such positive externalities are 
present, social welfare would be increased by use of the work, but the 
potential user may be deterred from use because he will not assess it at 
its full value. ill such cases, fair use may again serve to bypass 
licensing that appears too costly from the perspective of the potential 
user. 12 Here too the fair use doctrine has constitutional roots; the 
language and history of the constitutional grant of authority to enact 
federal copyright protection manifests the intent to promote the 
progress of knowledge through precisely these sorts ofuses.13 Fair use 
accommodates the interest in "progress" both directly, by providing the 
content for such exchanges, and indirectly, by fostering an aware and 
educated populace better able to participate in both public debate and the 
creation of future works of authorship. Once again, other copyright 
limitations an~ exceptions also perfonn these functions. 14 
10. See Lochner in Cyberspace, supra note 1; Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the 
Market Failure ~pproach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L 1 (1997). Alfred Yen has argued that society also may have "non-
economic" interests in such uses. See Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won't Sell: Parody, 
Fair Use, and Efficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 79 (1991); see also 
Lochner in Cyberspace, supra note 1, at 551-59. 
11. See Benkler, supra note 5; Perfect Curve, supra note 1; Neil Weinstock 
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE LJ. 283 (1996). 
Although few litigated cases have involved private noncommercial defendants, the 
Supreme Court's decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417 (1984), makes clear that even widespread private noncommercial copying may 
be fair. Id. at 447. 
12. This problem is most acute for cases of critical review or parody that might 
damage the market for the underlying work Society has a strong interest in the 
commentary or the burlesque, but the owner of copyright in the criticized work is likely 
to view production of such a derivative work as a direct threat to his or her (or its) 
interests. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-92; Richard A Posner, When is Parody Fair 
Use?,21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1992). 
13. See L Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC'y U.S. 365 (2000). 
14. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1998) (regarding library copying privileges); 17 
U.S.C. § 100(a) (1997) (limiting exclusive distribution right to first sale of copy for 
most works); 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1999) (exempting public performance and display for 
nonprofit activities and organizations). 
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Finally, fair use adapts copyright to new teclmologies that pose 
challenges for the traditional copyright framework. IS For example, 
courts have used fair use to provide "breathing room" for the reverse 
engineering of copyrighted computer programs. The creation of a new 
piece of software often requires examination of the structure of other 
programs to design an interoperable product. Unless patented, the 
utilitarian functions of computer programs lie in the public domain and 
may be freely copied by those developing competing or complementary 
programs. But the most efficient method of examining other software, 
de compilation of the operating code, necessarily creates a copy of the 
program being studied. This copying during the process of reverse 
engineering might be considered an infringement of copyright. 
However, courts have consistently held that making temporary or 
intelUlediate copies in order to study a program and extract public 
domain information is fair because it ensures the development of new 
markets in copyrightable works where copyright holders might 
otherwise dominate or impede such development by controlling access 
to uncopyrightable technical standards.16 
In a related application, fair use catalyzes limitations on the reach 
of contributory liability, thereby allowing the development of markets 
ancillary to those for copyrighted works. Under U.S. law, provision of 
a teclmology or' service that facilitates copyright infringement may itself 
constitute infringement. But such contributory infringement occurs 
only when the teclmology provided to enable direct infringement has no 
substantial noninfringing use - in other words, when the device 
supplied has essentially no use other than to infringe.17 This shelter for 
"dual pmpose" teclmologies prevents copyright holders from stunting 
the development of new markets tangential to their proprietary interests. 
Fair use frequently will provide the substantial noninfringinguse needed 
to invoke this protection. Thus, in So,?-y v. Universal City Studios,18 the 
Supreme Court held that sale of the Sony Betamax video recorder was 
15. See Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other 
Copyrightable Workr in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob, and Sega, 1 
J. INTELL. PROP. L 49 (1993). 
16. See Sony Computer Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602-08 
(9th Cir. 2000); DSC Connnunications Corp. v. DGI Teebs., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 
1996); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1539 n.18 (11th Cir. 1996); Sega 
Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992); Atari Games Corp. 
v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843-44 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
17. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 
(1984). 
18. Seeid. 
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not contributory infringement, despite the device's capacity to facilitate 
infringing recording of broadcast audiovisual works. The necessary 
non-infringing use was found in the practice of "time shifting," that is, 
taping a televised show at one time to be viewed at a later time, which 
the court found to be a fair use. This holding cleared the path for a 
flourishing market not only for home video recorders, but also for sale 
and rental of the plaintiff industry's copyrighted films. 19 
In sum, fair use plays an important - and constitutionally 
required - role in the dissemination and production of cultural 
products. As we now describe, however, fair use is currently 
threatened by a combination of new distribution technologies and 
unreflective legislative action. 
III. CURRENT TECHNICAL AND LEGAL 
~RASTRUCTURESFORRJGHTS~AGEMENT 
For copyright owners, digital networks represent both a promise 
and a threat. Computer networks eliminate or minimize many of the 
costs associated with the publication and distribution of information 
products but also substantially eliminate the costs of making and 
distributing unauthorized copies. Although scholars and industry 
commentators have disputed predictions that digital networks will 
destroy the market for authorized copies of works, copyright owners .. 
have stated a reluctance to experiment with· digital distribution without 
additional technological and legal protection against unauthorized 
19. Many connnentators have noted the irony of a ruling that pennitted content 
users to profit handsomely by losing their infiingement claim. We suspect that if the 
Court had held provision of VCRs to be contributory infringement, a market for video 
recorders and video rentals still would have emerged. Under a Coasean theory of 
arbitrage, assuming manageable transaction costs, if there were money to be made from 
the sale of VCRs, one would expect horne electronics manufacturers to negotiate a 
license from the copyright holders. Cf Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of 
the Patent System, 20 J.L & ECON. 265 (1977) (advancing a ''prospecf' theory of 
intellectual property rights, under which improvement rights are controlled by initial 
inventors). The VCRs developed and marketed under such an arrangement, however, 
most likely would have functioned rather differently than those available today. For 
example, they might have been designed only to play back prerecorded videotapes, or 
to incorporate built-in copy protection. Thus, the issue is not so much whether the 
technology and its associated market would have developed, but what the technology 
would have looked like, which is inescapably a function of who controlled (or did not 
control) the development of the market Cf Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of 
Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEx. L REv. 989 (1997) (arguing that 
reserving control of improvements for initial inventors is detrimental to innovation). 
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copying.20 Within the past few years, they have succeeded on both 
fronts. These new technological and legal protections confer a degree 
of control over access to and use of copyrighted content that goes well 
beyond the rights afforded by copyright law. 
Together with technology experts, the copyright industries have 
developed secure packaging and delivery software designed to prevent 
purchasers and third parties from making unauthorized uses of digital 
works. As envisioned by the copyright industries, these "rights 
management systems" will be capable of controlling, monitoring, and 
metering almost every conceivable use of a digital work?! This 
increased control, however, will allow copyright owners to appropriate 
far more protection than copyright law now provides. Of particular 
significance for this paper, copyright law allows some copying of 
protected expression under the fair use doctrine (and also under a 
variety of other exceptions designed to serve the public interest) and 
20. See, e.g., WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications Trade & Consumer Protection of the 
House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Robert W. Holleyman, 
11, President & CEO, The Business Software Alliance); Copyright Legislation: Hearings 
on H.R. 2281 Before the Subcomm. on Cts. & Intell. Prop. of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Congo (1997) (statements of Robert W. Holleyman, 11, President, The 
Business Software Alliance; Allee Willis, Songwriter, on behalf of Broadcast Music, Inc.; 
Tom Ryan, CEO, SciTech Software, Inc., on behalf of the Software Publishers' 
Association; Gail Markels, General Counsel and Senior Vice President, Interactive 
Digital Software Association; and Allan R. Adler, Vice President for Legal and 
Governmental Affairs, Association of American Publishers); National Information 
Infrastructure: Hearing on S. 1284 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, l04th 
Congo (1996) (statentent of Kenneth R. Kay, Executive Director, Creative Incentive 
Coalition); Copyright Protection on the Internet: Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before the 
Subcomm. on Cts. & Intell. Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, l04th Cong. 
(1996) (statements of Barbara A Munder, Senior Vice President, The McGraw-Hill 
Companies, Inc.; Frances W. Preston, President and CEO, Broadcast Music, Inc.; Jack 
Valenti, Chainnan and CEO, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.; and the 
Association of American Publishers). 
21. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gervais, Electronic Rights Management and Digital 
Identifier Systems, J. ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING, March 1999, at 
http://www.press.umich.eduJ jep/0403/gervais.html (last visited Oct 1, 2001); IPR 
Systems, What is Rights Management: The Nature of Knowledge and Rights 
Management Systems, at http://www.iprsystems.comlhtrnllrights _managementhtml 
(last visited Oct 1, 2001); Mark Steftk, Shifting the Possible: How Digital Property 
Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 138 
(1997). For useful directories of entities currently conducting rights management 
research andlor offering rights management services, see Gervais, supra; Lock-My-Doc, 
Digital Rights Management (DRM), at http://www.lockmydoc.comldrmldrm.html (last 
visited Oct 1,2001). 
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allows any" use after the teIDl of copyright protection has expired.22 
Rights management systems, in contrast, can insist that petmission be 
sought, and a fee paid, for any use. This is so, moreover, whether or 
not the underlying infoIDlation is still (or was ever) protected by 
copyright 
The copyright industries also have succeeded in obtaining extremely 
broad legal protection for rights management systems. After nearly 
three years of lobbying, both in Congress and in international treaty 
proceedings, the copyright industries were rewarded with Title I of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), which prohibits tampering 
with or circumventing these systems and also prohibits the 
manufacture, distribution, and importation of circumvention tools.23 
The DMCA also authorizes the Librarian of Congress, in consultation 
with the Register of Copyrights, to assess the impact of the 
circumvention ban on traditional fair use practices and, if necessary, to 
issue rules exempting certain users of certain categories of works from" 
the ban.24 The statute clearly states, however, that any such 
exemptions will not afford a defense to the prohibition on circumvention 
technologies.2S As a practical matter, therefore, any exemptions 
ultimately declared will have very limited utility; self-evidently, most 
22. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1998) (library copying privileges); 17 US.C. 
§ I09(a) (1997) (limitation of exclusive distribution right to first sale of copy for most 
works); 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1999) (public perfonnance and display exemptions for 
nonprofit activities and organizations); see also 17 US.C. § 302 (1998) (establishing 
duration of copyright protection). 
23. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L No. 105-304, Title I, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1998), codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)-(b) (1999). The DMCA's anti-device 
provisions exclude devices that have some other commercially significant purpose or 
use. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(l) (1999). As a practical matter, however, enabling 
uses of the underlying work that would be permitted by the fair use doctrine or some 
other exception to copyright protection is unlikely to qualify as commercially 
significant. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992) (directing court to consider, among other 
factors, "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work''); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985); 
David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. 
L. REv. 673, 712-14, 727-28 (2000). The 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty and its 
requirements concerning legal protection for rights management systems are discussed 
in Part V, infra. 
24. 17US.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B)-(D)(1999). 
25. 17 US.C. § 1201(a)(1)(E) (1999); see also Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 
82 F. Supp. 211, 322-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("If Congress has meant the fair use defense 
to apply to such actions [brought under the DMCA's anti-device provisions], it would 
have said so.''), appeal pending sub nom. Universal City Studios v. Corley, No. 00-9185 
(2d Cir.). 
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users will be unable to exercise their circumvention rights unless they 
are provided with the tools to do so. 
The development of rights management systems powerfully 
demonstrates the ability of technology to regulate behavior. Much as 
physical barriers and spatial relations constrain behavior in actual space, 
technical standards constrain behavior in cyberspace. In the physical 
world, people cannot walk through solid walls, occupy two spaces 
simultaneously, or carry skyscrapers away in their pockets.26 Similarly, 
there are certain activities that simply cannot be performed on a 
particular computer system because the system is not built to 
accommodate the behavior - the system may be programmed to deny 
access without a password, prevent logging on simultaneously from 
two terminals, or prohibit alteration of a file that is designated "read-
only." At first consideration, the observation that the technology will 
only do what the technology will do may seem blatantly obvious, even 
tautological. But as Larry Lessig and Joel Reidenberg have pointed out, 
technical standards are within the control of the designer and so confer 
upon the designer the power to govern behavior with· regard to that 
system.27 Once constraints on behavior are built into the technical 
standards governing a technology, the technical standards effectively 
become a new method for governing use of that technology - in 
essence, the technical standards become a type of law. Such technical 
rule sets may supplement or even supplant the legal rule sets designed 
to govern the same behavior. Thus, government may Ghoose to employ 
or enforce technical standards to achieve goals that otherwise might be 
achieved by legal rulemaking. Reidenberg in particular has examined in 
detail the complex set of interactions through which governmental 
action can shape technological standards into a substitute for legal 
controls.28 
The design of technological rule sets, however, is not the sole 
provenance of the state; indeed, it is more often left to private parties. 
In the case of rights management systems, copyright owners determine 
the rules that are embedded into the technological controls. By 
implementing technical constraints on access to and use of digital 
information, a copyright ownflr can effectively supersede the rules of 
intellectual property law. For example, as described above, the 
26. See Lawrence Lessig, Constitution and Code, 27 CUMBERLAND L REv. 1 
(1997). 
27. LAWRENCE LEsSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAwS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Joel R. 
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica, 76 TEX. L REv. 553 (1998). 
28. See id. at 568-76. 
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copyright owner may decide that the technological controls will not 
pennit any copying of the controlled content, whether or not the 
copying would be fair use.29 If the integrity of the controls is backed 
by the state, as it is under the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions, 
the legal enforcement of rights also shifts its focus from penalties for 
unauthorized infringement to penalties for access unauthorized by the 
rightsholder. 
The implications of these developments are stark: Where 
technological constraints substitute for legal constraints, control over 
the design of information rights is shifted into the hands of private 
parties, who mayor may not honor the public policies that animate 
public access doctrines such as fair use. Rightsholders can effectively 
write their own intellectual property statute in computer code. 
Moreover, to the extent that the DMCA appears to legitimate 
technological controls over copyrighted works, without regard to their 
effect on public policy, the statute effectively grants rubber-stamp 
approval to such private legislation. Yet this result - allowing every 
copyright owner to custom-design its own version of copyright law-
cannot conceivably have been what Congress intended.30 
Of course, the promulgation of technologically embedded rule sets 
is not the fIrst situation in which private allocation of rights to 
infonnation has been encouraged and enforced by public institutions. 
Most notably, the coercive power of the state is routinely brought to 
bear in the case of contractual agreements, such as confIdentiality 
agreements and intellectual property licenses. Since technical controls 
can impose conditions that fonnerly might have been the subject of a 
detailed license agreement, such controls might be viewed as equivalent 
to a sort of licensing regime. Then, extending the analogy, penalties for 
circumvention of the technological constraints simply stand in for the 
private law of contract, which penalizes breach of license. 
But such a comparison to contract law by no means justifIes 
employment of technical controls that contravene the established public 
policy of copyright Where traditional contracts are at issue, carte 
blanche enforcement of private agreements has never been the rule in 
Anglo-American law. When such agreements are found illegal, 
unconscionable, or simply in violation of public policy, they are held 
unenforceable.31 Because contract law is state law, a similar result also 
29. Stefik, supra note 21, at 147. 
30. Other language in the DMCA indicates as much. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
. 31. See RESfATEMENT(20) OF CONrRACTS §§ 8, 178, 179,208 (1979). 
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may be reached on grounds of federalism: Where enforcement of a 
state law contract would violate the public policy inherent in the federal 
intellectual property scheme, or that embedded in the Constitution itself, 
such contractual provisions are preempted.32 An attempt to leverage the 
federal statutory right beyond the limits set by federal policy constitutes 
grounds for voiding the contract. 
There is no reason to suppose that this result should differ for 
technological analogues to contracts. Where rights management 
systems attempt to impose restrictions on access to or use of 
informational content that would be improper in a contractual 
agreement, the restrictions should be viewed as equally repugnant to 
public policy and equally void. One of us has previously argued that the 
coercive power of the state should be extended in support of 
technological constraints no farther than it may be to enforce statutory 
or contractual constraints.33 Put differently, where the Constitution 
imposes limits on the government's creation and recognition of property 
rights in intellectual goods, those limits apply equally to both legally and 
technologically delineated property. In some instances of overreaching 
via technological controls, the Constitution may even demand a limited 
self-help right, or "right to hack," to surmount privately erected 
technological barriers to information that the Constitution requires be 
publiclyaccessible.34 
The familiar reply from the proponents of the anti-circumvention 
provisions appeals not to the language of contract but to the legitimate 
right to control access to private property. There is no right, it is said, 
to break into a dwelling to gain access to public domain information.3S 
32. For detailed analysis of the preemption question, see Self-Help, supra note 1; 
David L. Lange, The Intellectual Property Clause in Contemporary Trademark Law: An 
Appreciation of Two Recent Essays and Some Thoughts About Why We Ought to Care, 
59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 213 (1996); Mark A Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The 
Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REv. III (1999); David 
Nimmer et aI., The Metamorphosis of Contract Into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REv. 17 
(1999); MalIa Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of the 
Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of 
Shakespeare Co. v. SiIstar Corp., 18 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 259 (1995); David A. Rice, 
Public Goods. Private Contract. and Public Policy: Federal Preemption of Software 
License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PI1T. L. REv. 543 (1992). 
Because federal intellectual property policy is constitutional as well as statutory, 
moreover, whether Congress now intends to institute a rule of deference to these new 
"contracts" is irrelevant 
33. Self-Help, supra note 1, at 1140-42. 
34. See id. at 1140-42. 
35. See. e.g., NIl Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Joint Hearing Before the 
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This analogy to tangible property concludes that deployment of rights 
management systems to control access to intellectual property is no 
different than fencing or walling off privately held real estate. This 
analogy is highly problematic even in concept; both the economics of 
intangible infonnation and the scope of state-granted rights in 
informational works differ markedly from the economic and legal bases 
for private rights in real property.36 But even to the extent that an 
analogy to real property may hold true, the argument proves too much. 
The owner of private real estate cannot legitimately fence off easements 
or public rights of way, or extend the fence to encompass public 
thoroughfares.37 
Indeed, if the real property analogy is to be followed, public rights 
of access have long trumped the private right to fence. Rights 
management "fencing" finds a close parallel in the nineteenth-century 
enclosure of private land using the newly developed fencing technology 
of barbed wire. The application of this technology to open lands led to· 
the infamous "range warS," in which fencing of previously accessible 
parcels of privately owned range was countered by illegal fence-cutting 
tactics. But it is important to note that the development of this cheap 
and effective means of fencing prompted not only enclosure of 
legitimately held private lands, but also illegitimate and unauthorized 
enclosure of public lands. The end result was the enactment of statutes 
that penalized both the cutting of legitimate fences enclosing private 
property and the unauthorized e~closure of public lands.38 
If the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA are viewed as 
responses to the threat of "fence-cutting," then one must recognize that 
the analogy is more complete. The use of technology to block public 
access to public domain elements of managed content and/or to block 
fair uses of such content is equivalent to the unauthorized fencing of 
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Properly of the House Committee on the 
Judiciary and the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, l04th Congo (1995) (prepared 
statement of Matybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights) (analogizing copyright 
management protection to keeping a document locked in an office); David Friedman, 
In Defense of Private Orderings, 13 BERKELEY TECH. W. 1151 (1998); Raymond T. 
Nimmer, The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY 
TECH. W. 827 (1998). 
36. See Muddy Rules, supra note 1, at 133-35. 
37. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061, 1063; Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 528 (1897); 
Stoddard v. United States, 214 F. 566 (8th Cir. 1914); Hanley v. United States, 186 F. 
711 (9th Cir. 1911). 
38. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1061, 1063; ERNEST STAPLES OSGOOD, THE DAY OF THE 
CATTLEMAN 191-95 (1929); Scott S. Smith, The Wire that Won the West, AM. HERITAGE 
INVENTION & TECH., FaIl 1998, at 34, 38-40. 
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public lands. Unlike nineteenth-century fence-cutting laws, however, 
the anti-circumvention provisions do nothing to ensure that the public 
continues to enjoy the "easements" or "rights of way" that copyright 
holders have no legitimate right to withdraw from public access. This 
cannot be because such public rights no longer are recognized; the 
current text of the DMCA gives no indication of having repealed or 
annulled such public access rights. To the contrary, the statute 
explicitly states that fair use and other limitations on the scope of 
copyright continue to inure in digital media.39 Yet the current language 
of the statute makes no provision for such access. 
The question then, as one commentator has aptly observed, is 
whether the inclusion in the DMCA oflanguage reaffmning fair use is 
simply an empty promise.40 There is no need for it to be. As 
Reidenberg in particular has shown, Congress has at its disposal a 
variety of possible tools for directing technological development into 
channels that will further established public policy goalS.41 We suggest 
that in the case of rights management systems, this order has been 
disastrously inverted: perceived technological imperatives are improperly 
driving the enactment oflegal prohibitions. The rapid development and 
spread of technologies for digital copying and distribution has prompted 
a rush legally to shore up technological safeguards against such 
copying, without proper consideration of the policy balance that should 
animate both legal and technical infrastructures. fustead, legal 
protection for rights management systems should be designed with the 
desired policy balance in mind. Part N considers various possible 
mechanisms for achieving that result. 
N. OPTIONS FOR FAIR USE INFRASTRUCTURE 
Currently, the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions effectively 
sanction the use of private code to write the public law of fair use· out 
of existence. But the legal regime governing rights management 
technologies need not be structured in such a fashion. fustead, law 
could be designed to shift technological development in a direction that 
balances the incentive structure of copyright protection \vith 
copyright's concern for the public domain and for the legitimate fair use 
39. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(I) (1997). 
40. See Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the 
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 519, 
546-47 (1999) 
41. See Reidenberg, supra note 27, at 586-92. 
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privileges of the public. Here, we suggest modifications to the DMCA 
designed to create incentives for the preservation of fair use in digital 
media. 
Realizing the promise of fair use in a digital rights management 
environment will require some technical mechanism to allow public 
access and reuse privileges equivalent to those deemed fair in previous 
media. In broad brush, there are two ways that such a system might 
be designed. First, the rights management system itself might be 
designed to detect and regulate fair use access. Second, a 
decisionmaker external to the rights management system might 
authorize would-be fair users to override rights management controls. 
We propose a fair use infrastructure that combines elements of both 
approaches. 
A. Codingfor Fair Use 
The most direct method of accommodating fair use would be to 
mandate or prompt the development of rights management systems that 
directly allow purchasers of a work to make fair use of the content. 
Optimally, the "breathing space" required for fair uses would be 
programmed ciirectly into the technical rule set that controls access to 
the work. The systems might, for example, include provisions allowing 
users to extract a certain number of bits, or display the work for certain 
periods of time, or partially perform the work a certain number of 
times. Depending on the characteristics of the desired use, users would 
be able to take these actions without having to seek additional 
permission or pay additional fees. 
In reality, an algorithm-based approach to fair use is unlikely to 
accommodate even the shadow of fair use as formulated in current 
copyright law. We are not optimistic that system designers will be able 
to anticipate the range of access privileges that may be appropriate for 
fair uses to be made of a particular work. Neither are we optimistic 
that system designers will be able to anticipate the types of uses that 
would be considered fair by a court. Fair use is irreducibly a situation-
specific determination. In some instances, a user may fairly take a 
work in its entirety - say, for example, where the work is entitled to 
only thin protection, the use is for a protected purpose such as 
scholarship, criticism, or software reverse engineering, and/or the use 
is expected to have no appreciable impact on the market for the work.42 
42. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Sony Corp. 
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Sega Enters. v. Accolade, 
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Indeed, some uses, such as software reverse engineering or 
automatically searching text, music, or video files for particular words, 
themes, or images (a process essential for some types of academic 
research), are impossible if the user cannot gain access to the entire 
work.43 In other situations, where three or four of the factors weigh 
heavily against a particular use, taking much less might exceed fair 
use.44 
Building the range of possible uses and outcomes into computer 
code would require both a bewildering degree of complexity and an 
impossible level of prescience. There is currently no good algorithm 
that is capable of producing such an analysis. Relatedly, fair use is a 
dynamic, equitable doctrine designed to respond to changing conditions 
of use. Programmed fair use functionality, in contrast, is relatively 
static. At least for now, there is no feasible way to build rights 
management code that approximates both the individual results of 
judicial determinations and the overall dynamism of fair use 
jurisprudence. 
An alternative might be for copyright holders to build into rights 
management systems some level of discretionary access for users that 
would fall within a range that would almost always constitute fair use, 
or that at least would fall within a range of use that the copyright holder 
would be unwiiling to contest was fair. In the past, some attempts have 
been made to set similar standards, as for example in the case of the so-
called "safe harbor" provisions for educational photocopying negotiated 
by educators, librarians, and the copyright industries during the 1976 
revisions to the Copyright Act, or in the case of the aborted 
"Conference on Fair Use" ("CONFU"), which attempted to negotiate 
fair use standards for digital and multimedia works.45 Such default 
977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Higgins v. Detroit Educ. Television Found., 4 F. Supp. 
2d 701, 707 (E.D. Mich. 1998). 
43. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1526-28; Andrew W. Appel & 
Edward W. Felten, Technological Access Control Inteiferes with Noninfringing 
Scholarship (Feb. 17,2000) (public comment filed with Copyright Office). 
44. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 
(1985); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 72-73 
(2d Cir. 1999). 
45. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., at 68--74 (1976) (setting forth 
Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational 
Institutions With Respect to Books and Periodicals), reprinted in 1976 u.S.C.C.AN. 
5659, 5681-88; INFORMATION INFRASTRUCfURE TASK FORCE, INTELLEcruAL 
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRAsrRUCfURE: THE REpORT OF THE 
WORKING GROUP ON INTELLEcruAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 83-84 (1995) [hereinafter NIl 
WmTE PAPER] (discussing establishment and progress of CONFU). 
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parameters for fair use represent private agreements by stakeholders to 
treat the designated level of usage as fair without a prior judicial 
determination. Such agreed-upon standards might be built into the 
access pennitted by rights management systems. 
We are again skeptical, however, about the ability of negotiated 
defaults to capture the full range of social benefit that more flexible legal 
standards allow. While these defaults sometimes might allow access 
that would exceed fair use under a judicial determination, the "safe 
harbor" concept is more likely to tend toward a minimalist view of fair 
use. We suspect that copyright holders would be willing to concede 
fair use in only a small fraction of the situations that would constitute 
fair use - indeed, it was just such insistence upon minimalist guidelines 
by rights holders that led to the collapse of the CONFU discussions.46 
Moreover, in the case of the 1976 "safe harbor" guidelines for 
educational copying, rights holders, content users, and even courts have 
shown a deplorable tendency to act as though the guidelines defined the 
outer limits of fair use.47 To the contrary, such guidelines were 
intended to delineate fair use minima: a floor rather than a ceiling. 48 We 
are consequently reluctant to recommend an infrastructure based solely 
on the design of similar defaults into self-enforcing "lock-out" systems 
for fear that the "ceiling" effect could be even more pernicious. 
A variant on the concept of directly designed fair use "defaults" 
would look to a different source for the substance of the defaults. 
Judicial determinations and negotiated minimum standards are not the 
only possible measures of current fair use practice; arguably, the more 
46. See Final Report to the Commissioner on the Conclusion of the Conference on 
Fair Use (Nov. 1998), at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/ 
confufconfurep.hhn (last visited Oct 1,2001). 
47. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 
1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en bane), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1156 (1997); Marcus v. Rowley, 
695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics CoIp., 758 F. 
Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Tyco Copy Service, 
Inc., Copyright L Rep. (CeIl) 1f 25,230 (D. Conn. 1981); Basic Books, Inc. v. Gnomon 
Corp., Copyright L Rep. (CCH) 1f 25,145 (D. Conn. 1980); NIl WHITE PAPER, supra 
note 45, at 82-83 ("Educational uses that serve the same ends and are constrained in 
the same manner as the copying permitted under the Classroom Guidelines will likely 
be fair . . . ."); Robert Kasunic, Fair Use and the Educator's Right to Photocopy 
Copyrighted Material [or Classroom Use, 19 J.C. & U.L 271, 281, 284-85 (1993); 
Albert D. Spaulding, Fair Use of Research and Course Packets in the Classroom, 31 AM. 
Bus. U. 447,448 (1993). 
48. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 68-74 (1976), reprinted 
in 1976 US.C.C.AN. 5659,5681-88. 
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accurate measure of fair use is the daily behavior of ordinary users.49 
Rather than approximating the results of fair use jurisprudence or the 
products of interest-group bargaining, rights management systems 
might be designed to approximate fair use norms. For this to work, 
copyright management systems would need to sanction a large amount 
of unauthorized copying, but on a relatively small scale. so A precedent 
for this sort of rule is the Audio Home Recording Act, which requires 
that digital audio tape recordings and recording devices be designed to 
accommodate serial copy management technology that allows the 
production of only one generation of perfect copies.51 Another example 
is section 1201(1<) of the DMCA, which requires that copy-control 
technologies for videocassette recorders preserve the ability to time-
shift broadcast and some cable television programming.52 We do not 
mean to suggest that the scope of either statutory provision is optimal, 
but simply that the provisions are illustrative of this type of 
functionality. 
Norm-based fair use defaults, however, are subject to many of the 
same criticisms as negotiated fair llse defaults. Such defaults still 
would be inflexible at the margin, and still would not encompass the full 
range of uses that a court would hold fair. Thus, if norm-based 
controls were regarded as implementing a fair use ceiling rather than a 
fair use floor, users of digital works would enjoy far less fair use than 
they have enjoyed in traditional media. Once again, we cannot 
recommend a fair use infrastructure based solely on this sort of fair use 
default. 
49. Cj Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. U. 
29, 35-37 (1994) [hereinafter Litman, Exclusive Right]; Jessica Litman, Copyright 
Noncompliance (or Why We Can't "Just Say Yes" to Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. lNT'L L 
& POL. 237 (1997). 
50. We note that the norm regarding personal copying of music has shifted 
somewhat with the advent of MP3 compression technology. Whether the law should 
sanction this shift, and under what circumstances, are hotly contested questions. See 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG Recordings, 
Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). In any process to specify 
automatic fair use defaults, questions like this will require careful consideration. 
S!. See 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (2001). 
52. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(k)(2) (2001); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that this customary practice is a fair 
use). 
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B. Key Access for Fair Use 
The second option for the design of fair use infrastructure involves 
the introduction of an external decisionmaker into the process for 
obtaining access to technologically secured works. At present, only 
human intelligence, reviewing the unique circumstances of a particular 
use, can determine whether it is likely to be fair. Thus, we might 
require users to apply for keys to access the encrypted work. This 
option would allow case-by-case determination of the need for access, 
building in judgment capabilities that cannot practically be emulated by 
technical defaults. 
One such method might be to place the fair use determination in the 
rights holder's hands. We cannot, however, recommend a legal rule 
that would fundamentally shift the decisionmaking authority about 
whether to proceed with a use from users to owners. As we have 
described above, fair use frequently condones public access in 
situations where the collective public interest runs contrary to the rights 
holder's individual interest. Thus, there may be a strong incentive for 
the rights holder to deny access just when the public interest most 
demands access. Currently, users do not need to apply to anyone to 
engage in a use the user deems fair. The user simply must be willing 
to pay infringement damages should her determination be erroneous. 
Placing the burden of application on the user would drastically change 
the dynamics of fair use and would create unacceptable social costs.53 
In addition, a preauthorization system for fair use is vulnerable to 
three more general obj ections. The first and second, closely related, are 
that a pre authorization requirement would be costly and would chill ' 
spontaneous uses. Case by case determination of the fairness of the 
intended use would require a lengthy and complicated approval process. 
53. An example of this sort of burden-shifting is Title II of the DMCA, which 
establishes a procedure for copyright owners to demand that online service providers 
remove allegedly infringing material from their systems. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) 
(2001). In several high·profile disputes, copyright owners have invoked this 
extrajudicial "notice and takedown" procedure against uses of copyrighted material that 
lie at the core of protected First Amendment activity. See Universal City Studios, Inc. 
v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), appeal pending sub nom. Universal 
City Studios v. Corley, No. 00-9185 (2d Cir.); Felten v. Recording Industry Ass'n of 
America, Inc., No. CV-01-2660 (GEB) (D.N.J.); Julie E. Cohen, Gall it the Digital 
Millennium Censorship Act: Unfair Use, THE NEW REpUBLIC ONLINE, May 23, 2000, 
at http://www.tnr.com/onlinelcohen052300.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2001) (descn'bing 
Microsoft's attempt to use the notice and takedown procedure to silence critics of its 
specification for implementation of the Ketberos Web security standard). 
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Even a quick and inexpensive pre-screening procedure, however, will 
impose some transaction costs and will deter some uses that otherwise 
would have been made. As noted above, considerable social benefit 
accrues from this sort of unplanned use. Research and teaching, in 
particular, are processes that contain an irreducible element of ad hoc 
adjustment. 
The third objection is that application to a third party is likely to 
compromise the sort of anonymity that users presently enjoy. 
Anonymity is the current default for fair use access (and indeed for 
access generally) in traditional media - a copyright holder does not 
know who has made use of the work, or at what time, or in what 
manner. Even if the fair use results in publication or dissemination of 
a subsidiary work, the author need not reveal her name. For reasons 
already discussed, we are particularly reluctant to recommend that this 
situation be inverted by requiring revelation to the rights holder of a 
user's identity and use for every fair use. More generally, there exists 
a wide range of situations - for example, those involving parodies or 
other negative critiques - in which the user may prefer to remain 
anonymous. Requiring parodists and other fair users to apply to a third 
party for access may chill such uses. As one of us haS outlined in detail 
elsewhere, there is a strong case for a constitutional right to receive 
information anonymously.54 Creation of a statutory scheme that 
requires users to identify themselves would seem to run contrary to this 
right and thus risks constitutional infirmity. 55 
To avoid the risk of private censorship by rights holders, it seems 
that any ex~emally-mediated mechanism for preserving fair use in digital 
works will require the participation of some third party. In some cases, 
existing institutions might be conscripted into mediating access. For 
example, one could envision a procedure by which, if the owner had 
refused access, the needed access co~ld be judicially compelled upon 
determination that the proposed use was likely to be fair. In the patent 
system, declaratory judgments of non-infringement are routinely 
requested of courts before a plaintiff engages in potentially infringing 
activity. A legal procedure of this type would pla~e the fair use 
54. See Read Anonymously, supra note l. 
55. For this reason, we do not support the solution recently adopted by Australia, 
which allows distribution of a circumvention device only if the recipient provides a 
signed declaration that the device will be used only for permitted purposes. See 
Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act 2000, Schedule 1, § 116A(3) (Aus.) 
(amending Copyright Act (1968)). 
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determination back into the hands of a neutral decisionmaker, rather 
than putting it at the mercy of the copyright holder. 
A judicially-administered procedure, however, does not seem well 
calculated to cure cost, spontaneity, or anonymity objections. Any 
procedure requiring an ex ante judicial evaluation of fairness would 
dramatically raise the cost of fair use and would essentially transform 
the fair use right from a liability rule to a property rule. 56 Under the 
current conception of fair use, the decision whether or not to use a 
work is made ex ante by the user - if an infringement suit is brought 
later, the court mayor may not validate the user's calculus, "but 
penalties, if any, are imposed after the use has been undertaken. 
Requiringpriorjudicial determination unquestionably would deter many 
uses. Spontaneous uses likely would disappear altogether. Indeed, 
under this system, fair use might become the sole provenance of well-
capitalized firms with the resources to engage in the process. Such 
firms would do so only where the likely reward of gaining access 
exceeded the cost of the procedure. We suspect that this, in turn, 
would undermine one of the fair use doctrine's great strengths: its 
ability to recognize and legitimize changing norms of access and use.57 
Moreover, the possibility of anonymous use again would be endangered, 
absent some procedural device to conceal the identity of the fair use 
plaintiff during the court proceeding. 
External mediation of fair use access thus requires third party 
intervention at a relatively low cost, with modifications designed to 
protect anonymity to the greatest extent possible. In this capacity, the 
mediating party ,vill need to perform functions not currently performed 
by existing institutions, and the mediating party still must command the 
trust of both the owner and the user of the work. For example, Mark 
Stefik and Alex Silverman have proposed the idea of a Digital Property 
56. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972) 
(categorizing entitlements as property rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules). As 
a liability rule, fair use is essentially a compulsory license at a zero royalty. See Dan L 
Burk, The Trouble With Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27, 50 (2000). 
57. C[. Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (Or Why We Can't "Just Say Yes" 
to Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & POL 237 (1997) (arguing that the substance of 
copyright law must reasonably approximate ordinary people's understanding of what is 
and is not infringement); Michael Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the 
Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1025 (1998) (arguing that courts hearing copyright 
cases should make affirmative efforts to articulate and preserve norms of "open space" 
within copyright law). 
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Trust, composed of representatives from both the copyright industries 
and consumer groups, that would administer fair use access.58 
A concept developed in the context of electronic commerce 
supplies a more detailed model for such a third~party institution. 
Innovators in electronic commerce determined early on that encryption 
technology 
alone could not provide the needed security and authentication for 
online transactions.59 Public key cryptography can provide 
technologically unbreakable security and technologically unfalsifiable 
user identification but cannot ensure that the humans who employ the 
cryptographic keys to the technological systems have kept those keys 
secure; rather, this technological retrofit of open networks must be 
supported by institutional infrastructure. The intervention of a "trusted 
third party" that associates keys with particular users is one way to 
verifY the security of electronic transactions.60 
Thus far, the notion of a network of trusted third party 
intennediaries for electronic commerce has not fulfilled its initial 
promise. A lack of consensus on the.appropriate set oflegal rights and 
responsibilities for these entities seems partly to blame. The early legal 
literature on trusted third parties outlined a spectrum of legal theories 
for holding them liable to their clients or to reliance parties.61 
Meanwhile, early ventures attempted to avoid such liability with a set of 
boilerplate disclaimers poorly designed to inspire trust 62 While the 
58. See Mark Stefik & Alex Silverman, The Bit and the Pendulum: Balancing the 
Interests of Stakeholders in Digital Publishing, 7 AM. PROGRAMMER 1, 13-14 (1997). 
59. Cryptographic applications have become important to electronic commerce 
because of the essentially insecure nature of the protocols governing the Internet This 
open architecture provides for wide interoperability and sharing of resources, but does 
not lend itself to robust security or user authentication. See Dan L. Burk, Cyberlaw and 
the Nonns of Science, 1999 B.C. INT. PROP. & TECH. F. (1999), available at 
http://infoeagle.bc.edufbc_ orglavp/law/st_ orgliptflcommentary/contentlburk.html (last 
visited Oct 1, 2001). However, with the growth of electronic commerce, the network 
is increasingly used for purposes that require secure communications and user 
authentication. To facilitate these new uses, cryptographic technologies and protocols 
must be overlaid on the network to provide security and authentication. See Public Key 
Infrastructure Symposium, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 241 (1998). 
60. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in 
Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L. REv. 49, 52-53 (1996). 
61. See id.; Jane Kaufinan Winn, Couriers Without Luggage: Negotiable 
Instruments and Digital Signatures, 49 S.C. L. REv. 739 (1998) [hereinafter WinD, 
Couriers]; Jane Kaufman WinD, Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of Internet 
Commerce,72 TtlL. L. REv. 1177 (1998) [hereinafter WinD, Open Systems]. 
62. See Froomkin, supra note 60, at 105-07 (discussing VeriSign's standard form 
agreement for users); Winn, Couriers, supra note 61, at 773-79 (same); WinD, Open 
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debate about liability was raging, better alternatives emerged. Other 
technological innovators joined forces with existing major players in 
automated transactions claiming to establish secure Internet transaction 
protocols that did not directly involve users in the cumbersome 
exchange and authentication ofkeys.63 
In the digital rights management arena, however, we think that the 
case for the development of trusted third parties is clearer, and that the 
legal obstacles that have prevented the development of a trusted third 
party key infrastructure for electronic commerce may be more easily 
avoided. As already discussed, prospects for an adequate fair use 
infrastructure that is fully automated and operates invisibly to users 
seem poor. Thus far, the content industries have shown no inclination 
to develop a rights management infrastructure that will ensure the 
proper balance of access and security previously achieved in nondigital 
media. The system we propose, however, relies on law to change the 
incentives in the existing market for digital rights management systems: 
Our proposal hinges upon the concept of key escrow, that is, 
management of rights management keys by a trusted third party, rather 
than by the owner of a work. Keys to technologically protected works 
would be held by the trusted third party, who would release them to 
users applying for access to make fair use. The trusted third party 
would be a publicly funded institution that would be statutorily insulated 
from both direct and indirect copyright infringement liability and subject 
to regulatory oversight for compliance with its escrow and privacy 
obligations. 
Although, as we have noted, any pre authorization requirement 
would impinge upon spontaneous uses and thereby threaten the overall 
flexibility and adaptability of the fair use system, the trusted third 
party's approval procedure could be designed to minimize this impact. 
In order to avoid difficult ex ante judgments about particular uses, and 
to approximate as nearly as possible the cost and incentive structure of 
traditional fair uses, the third party would not be required, and would 
not attempt, to make a determination about the bona fides of the access 
application. Rather, the third party would simply issue keys to 
applicants via a simple online procedure. 
Solving the anonymity problem is far more difficult. The concept 
of key escrow has been vilified in the past, with good reason, when it 
Systems,supra note 61, at 124~9 (same). 
63. See Jane Kaufman Winn, Clash of the Titans: Regulating the Competition 
Between Established alld Emerging Payment Systems, 14 BERKELEY TECH. W. 675 
(1999). 
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constituted the core of a governmental plan that would have 
systematically undermined the integrity of private communications.64 
But a different sort of privacy interest is at stake here, where the issue 
is public access to publicly distributed works of authorship, rather than 
governmental access to private communications. In this instance, the 
concept of third-party escrow works toward the public interest and 
could be made to work in favor of preserving privacy, rather than 
against both goals . 
.As one alternative, a trusted third party system could be designed 
for true anonymity. Under such a system, the escrow agent would 
release keys to applicants without retaining or even generating 
identifying records. Such a system would replicate the anonymity that 
fair users enjoy in traditional media. In some cases, it might even 
provide stronger anonymity - as, for example, where anonymous 
access via escrowed keys might substitute for checking a work out of 
the library. For exactly this reason, though, we suspect that this sort 
of arrangement is likely to be politically unacceptable. 
A second-best alternative would require that the agent keep records 
of the applications and keys issued, but would subject the records to 
stringent privacy protections similar to those that now protect many 
library patron records. We think it likely that the copyright industries 
would demand the ability to match keys with identities so that the 
subsequent appearance of pirated materials could be linked to particular 
applicants for access.6S However, we would re~ommend that 
identifying information be released only pursuant to a court order, and 
only on a showing of actual piracy, as distinct from garden-variety 
infringement or arguable fair use. This places some evidentiary burden 
on the copyright holder, but we note that this mechanism nonetheless 
would give rights owners a substantial advantage that they do not enjoy 
for works distributed in traditional media. In addition, regulations 
governing the privacy practices of trusted third parties should prohibit 
sale or other transfer of key access information and should require that 
access and usage records be destroyed after some period of time. At 
the same time, however, we would accept a requirement that the keys 
64. See A. Michael Froomkin, It Came From Planet Clipper: The Battle Over 
Cryptographic Key "Escrow", 1996 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 15 (1996); Hal Abelson et al., The 
Risks of Key Recovery, Key Escrow, and Trusted Third Party Encryption (1998), at 
http://www.cdtorglcrypto/risks98 (last visited Oct 1,2001). 
65. Tying pirated materials to fair use applicants would require either issuing unique 
keys to each applicant or using "digital watennarks" to identifY individual copies of the 
work; both methods appear to be within the capabilities of current technology. 
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themselves be copy-protected and would support some penalties for 
unauthorized duplication ofkeys.66 
We are cautiously optimistic that this combination of controlled key 
access plus rigorous privacy protections could prevent the use of key 
access information to intimidate critics, parodists, and the like, while 
simultaneously minimizing abuse of the system for large-scale piracy. 
Nonetheless, we label this arrangement "second-best" because even the 
most stringent system of privacy protections for fair users is likely to 
chill some lawful uses. 
C. Mixed Fair Use Infrastructure 
Each of the two possible mechanisms for preserving fair use in a 
digital rights management environment bas advantages and drawbacks. 
Automatic fair use functionality does not require human intervention but 
is unlikely to afford the full spectrum offairuses allowed by law. The 
use of a trusted third party intermediary to mediate access, in contrast, 
potentially allows the full spectrum of uses but is less responsive to 
anonymity and spontaneity concerns. The optimal result, we suggest, 
is an infrastructure that combines the two. 
The first hiyer of our proposed fair use infrastructure would involve 
the design of rights management technologies that incorporate 
automatic fair use defaults based on customary norms of personal 
noncommercial use. The legal rule for facilitating this part of the 
proposal would operate in a fashion similar to current provisions of the 
Copyright Act designed to encourage copyright registration and deposit, 
by conditioning copyright enforcement for United States works on 
implementation of the automatic fair use defaults.67 To guard against a 
"race to the bottom" in fair use law, the law would clearly state that the 
level of copying permitted by the automatic defaults does not define the 
full extent of permitted fair use. 
Those who desire greater fair use access, meanwhile, would turn 
to the trusted third party intermediary. Under the system, deposit of 
66. We would not, however, support penalties for the manufacture or distribution 
of technologies capable of copying keys. Cj 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(l) (1999); 
supra text accompanying notes 25-41. 
67. See 17 U.S.C. § 41l(a) (1999); see also infra Part V (discussing treaty 
compliance issues). A ''United States work" is a work fust published in the United 
States, fust published simultaneously in the United States and a foreign nation, or fust 
publisbed in a foreign nation that is not a treaty party if all of the authors are nationals 
or domiciliaries of the United States or legal entities beadquartered within the United 
States. See 17U.S.C.A. § 101 (2001). 
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access keys into key escrow would be facilitated by conditioning anti-
circumvention protection for both United States and non-United States 
works on such deposit.68 Users who failed to obtain access via the 
escrow agent would be subject to suit for circumventing technical 
measures. Those users, however, still might escape liability by 
successful invocation of a statutory or constitutional defense to 
circumvention liability. Rights holders that opt not to deposit keys ,vith 
the escrow agent would be unable to invoke legal protection against 
circumvention. For such unescrowed works, a "right to hack" would 
effectively substitute for access via the escrowed keys. As noted in 
Part ill, the DMCA's ban on the manufacture and distribution of 
circumvention technologies also would need to be modified to make this 
defense a realistic possibility.69 Finally, to preserve the relative 
anonymity of the key escrow system, the records of applicants and 
keys issued would need to be guarded by stringent legal protections 
along the lines described above. 
The most likely and appropriate escrow agent would be a publicly 
funded institution, such as the Library of Congress. As indicated 
above, we see little prospect for development of private escrow agents. 
Content owners are unlikely to pay voluntarily for 'an institution that 
facilitates low cost or free access to their works?O Fair users are 
almost by defuiition poor candidates to fund an escrow institution. In 
any case, the point of fair use is to provide low cost or free access to 
content; assessing fair use fees to fund escrow agents would run 
counter to this purpose. Even were content owners to fund a private 
key escrow institution, however, we think that a publicly funded 
institution would be the preferred choice because the public policies 
underlying fair use require some guarantees of public accountability and 
institutional longevity. 
The Library of Congress's long e.xperience with copyright matters 
and with the deposit and archival preservation of copyrighted works 
68. See 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1999); 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1994); see also infra Part V 
(discussing treaty compliance issues). 
69. For this and other reasons, although the Copyright Office might be charged with 
establishing the escrow facility, it could not effectively do so on its own authority 
within the current statutory framework established by the DMCA. In addition, we think 
that establishing a comprehensive system of key escrow for fair use probably would be 
inconsistent with the DMCA's more limited grant of authority to the Copyright Office 
to declare certain exemptions to the ban on circumvention of rights management 
protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (1999). 
70. It is worth nothing, however, that the data processing industry has made efforts 
to "self regulate" in the face of threatened privacy legislation. 
HeinOnline -- 15 Harv. J. L. Tech 67 2001-2002
No.1] Fair Use Infrastructure 67 
makes it the ideal candidate to fill the escrow role.71 In our view, 
moreover, the deposit requirement that currently applies to published or 
registered works would require copyright owners to provide the Library 
of Congress with the unrestricted ability to read, view, or listen to the 
work and to subject the work to any digital storage and search tools 
that the Library might develop or acquire.72 Our proposal offers a 
means of administering fair use access to these deposited works. 
Finally, the tradition of strong privacy protection by libraries, including 
the Library of Congress, makes such an institution best suited to 
maintaining the privacy of fair users.73 Funding for the fair use 
infrastructure could be provided either through general taxation, by a 
small administrative fee levied on copyright owners, or by some 
combination of the two. 
Additionally, the system would need to include an exemption for 
trade secret works.74 Special care must be taken, however, lest this 
exemption swallow the rules mandating fair use access. As in the' 
world of copyrighted works distributed before the advent of technical 
protection, we anticipate that for the' majority of creative works -
poems, plays, novels, films, sound recordings - no credible question 
of trade secrecy should ever arise. A work should not be deemed to 
contain trade secrets simply because the copyright owner has elected 
to shroud it with technological protection. No work held out to the 
general public, or to anyone belonging to a particular subset (e.g., 
materials scienti~ts, interior' decorators, Fortune 500 corporate 
librarians, or individuals making more than $100,000 a year) should be 
eligible for a trade secrecy exemption. More particularly, computer 
71. The archival preservation of digital works raises complex problems concerning 
the degradation of storage media and the obsolescence of storage, retrieval, and display 
formats. See The Internet Archive: Building an 'Internet Library' Storage and 
Preservation of the Collections (2001), at http://www.archive.org/aboutlstorage.htrnl 
(last visited OCl I, 2001); Brewster Kahle et aI., Public Access to Digital Materials 
(2001), at http://www.archive.org/newslcolloquial200lIPublicAccess0309.doc (last 
visited Oct 1,2001). Designating the Library of Congress as the key escrow custodian 
likely would improve the ubrary's ability to study these issues and to optimize its 
preservation capabilities. 
72. See 17 U.S.C. § 407 (1999); 17 U.S.C. § 408(b) (1994). 
73. See Library of Congress Regulation 1917-3, § 5(B)(13) (1997); Read 
Anonymously, supra note 1, at 1031 & n.2l3. 
74. Other federal statutes requiring agencies to disclose information contain similar 
e.'{emptions. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1994) (exempting trade secrets from the 
Freedom of Information Act); 10 C.F.R § 207.4 (providing that trade secrets conveyed 
under ESECA are e.'{empted from public disclosure); 21 C.F.R. §§ 20.20(a), 20.6l(c) 
(exempting trade secrets conveyed to FDA from public disclosure). 
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software marketed to the general public or to a specific subset (e.g., 
small businesses or graphic designers) also should not be eligible for a 
"trade secret" designation because a rule exempting software from the 
system would negate fair use jurisprudence allowing decompilation of 
software to discover its unprotected functional elements.7s We note, 
finally, that in the case of computer programs, keys provided for fair 
use access will need to have the ability to override technological 
restraints on decompilation.76 
Finally, we note that there may be some concern under this system 
regarding the access of foreign nationals to keys, allowing offshore 
competitors to bypass technical protections on American products. 
Given that we have proposed an exemption for legitimate trade secrets, 
we believe that there should be little concern about this scenario. First, 
under our proposal, as under the law of copyright prior to the DMCA, 
foreign nationals would be at perfect liberty to travel to the United 
States to acquire and make fair use of copyrighted works, including the 
reverse engineering of software. With regard to offshore activity, 
requisitioning of keys would be largely immaterial for those nations that 
lack anti-circumvention laws; they could otherwise simply obtain the 
work and legally hack around its technical protections. Moreover, in 
countries that have their own anti-circumvention prohibitions, use of the 
keys would still be constrained by the requirement to conform with 
local copyright law. 
The presence of other national laws regarding anti-circumvention 
highlights the fact that the balance between access and protection must 
be struck in a global milieu, where the U.S. approach to technical 
protection is not insular and where our suggestion may find broader 
application than the American DMCA. Although we have focused on 
the implementation of a fair use infrastructure within U.S. copyright 
law, the escrow principles we have outlined here also might find 
application under the European Union's ("E.U.") new copyright 
75. The DMCA's current exception to the circumvention and device bans for 
software reverse engineering pennits only a subset of the conduct that would be 
considered fair use under copyright law. See infra text accompanying notes 106-07. 
76. We do not, however, advocate direct release of source code to would-be reverse 
engineers. As Pamela Samuelson and Suzanne Scotchmer explain, requiring competitors 
to do the work of reverse engineering preserves important first-mover incentives. See 
Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse 
Engineering, WI YALE L.I. (forthcoming 2002); see also Pamela Samuelson et aI., A 
Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 
2308 (1994) (arguing that software innovation requires a limited amount of artificial 
lead time to avoid market failure). 
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directive, which in some respects reflects greater cognizance of the 
user access problem than does its American counterpart?7 Like the 
DMCA, the E. U. Copyright Directive requires member states to provide 
legal protection for rights management systems.78 Unlike its U.S. 
analogue, however, the E.u. Copyright Directive allows member states 
to enact legislation requiring that copyright holders provide users with 
the means to take advantage of exceptions or limitations to the exclusive 
rights granted under copyright law.79 These limitations and exceptions, 
which are enumerated in the directive, specifically include private 
reproduction, criticism and parody, and news reporting.so To prevent 
user rights from being nullified by technical controls, moreover, the 
directive creates an incentive for content owners to design technical 
measures capable of facilitating permitted uses; member states may 
legislate to compel the provision of means for access only if content 
owners have not already provided such means vo1untarily.sl The key 
77. Directive 2ooIl29IEC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society, 2001 OJ. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter E.U. Copyright Directive]. 
78. See id. arts. 6(1)-(2). Although the directive employs some language that is 
reminiscent of the DMCA, it adheres more closely than the DMCA to the language of 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty, discussed infra text accompanying notes 84-86. Like the 
treaty, the E.U Copyright Directive merely requires member states to provide 
"adequate legal protection" against acts of knowing circumvention and against the 
manufacture and. distribution of circumvention devices. E.U. Copyright Directive, supra 
note 77, arts. 6(1)-(2). It lacks the convoluted and contradictOlY DMCA language 
distinguishing access and use controls, as well as the DMCA's lengthy list of complex 
exceptions. 
79. See E.U Copyright Directive, supra note 77, art 6(4). 
80. See id. art 5. 
81. We note that the E.U. Copyright Directive contains a troubling provision that 
recognizes "agreements between rightsholders and other parties" as one of the 
''voluntary measures" that content owners can adopt in order to provide users with the 
means of benefitting from an exception or limitation. E.U. Copyright Directive, supra 
note 77, art 6(4). Under one reading, this provision might permit content owners to 
require users to waive their rights to the benefit of exceptions or limitations as a 
condition of access. Given the recent history in the United States of mass market 
licenses that purport to abrogate fair use and other user privileges, this European 
prmision might seem an invitation to the proliferation of similar "sbrinkwrap" or 
"clickwrap" license provisions. See generally Mark A. Lemley, InteIlectual Property 
and Shrinlrnrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L REv. 1239 (1995); Madison, supra note 57; J.H. 
Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated InteIlectual Property Rights: 
Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 47 U. PA. L 
REv. 875 (1999). We suggest, however, that such provisions would not give consumers 
the intended benefits of copyright exemptions and limitations that the directive 
requires, and that use of boilerplate waivers instead should trigger the enactment of a 
key escrow requirement or a similar legislatively mandated means of fair use access. 
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escrow system that we propose here might be an appropriate means by 
which member states could ensure user access, or promote voluntary 
provision of access by copyright owners. 
It is worth noting that the E.U. Copyright Directive contemplates 
nothing so broad, flexible, or indeterminate as the U.S. concept of fair 
use. Rather, in the European tradition of "fair dealing," the directive 
lists specific circumstances under which member states may allow a 
user to make unauthorized use of a copyrighted work.82 The exceptions 
and limitations enumerated in the directive are discrete and relatively 
narrow. Design of a rights management infrastructure that would allow 
users access commensurate with such exceptions may be less 
challenging than design of an infrastructure to accommodate U.S.-style 
fair use. Nonetheless, we expect that it would still be difficult to design 
an algorithm that could take into account whether, for example, a 
reproduction is "for private use and for ends that are neither directly nor 
indirectly commercial," as the directive requires.83 Thus, the key 
escrow option discussed here may remain an attractive method of 
providing user access. 
Our proposal will not exactly reproduce the conditions of fair use 
in traditional media. Although code is malleable, digital media work 
differently than traditional media in too many ways. Nonetheless, we 
think that a niixed fair use infrastructure based on both automatic 
default and key escrow elements would go a long way toward 
approximating traditional fair use conditions. We note, as well, that 
development of a mixed infrastructure for digital fair use might lead to 
recognition of "new" fair uses never needed for works in nondigital 
media - for example, a right to access a work for certain purposes 
after expiration of a time-limited subscription agreement. Thus, our 
proposal would enable the continued evolution of fair use practices and 
noons. We turn now to considerap.on of whether the proposal is 
feasible as a matter of intemationallaw and desirable as a matter of 
policy. 
v . TREATY CONSTRAINTS 
A critical consideration in evaluating the feasibility of the system 
proposed here is whether legally-induced, automatic fair use defaults 
and legally induced escrow of rights management keys would comport 
82. See E.U. Copyright Directive, supra note 77, art. 5. 
83. ld. art. (5)(2)(b). 
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with the obligations imposed on the United States by international 
copyright treaties. Here, we consider the proposal's compatibility with 
the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") Copyright 
Treaty, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works ("Berne Convention"), and the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs"). We conclude that 
the proposal passes muster under all these agreements. 
As an initial matter it might seem that our proposal would be most 
likely to run afoul of the provisions of the WIPO Copyright Treaty. 
After all, the passage of the current DMCA was purported to' be 
necessary to bring United States copyright law into line with its 
obligations under that treaty.84 As Pamela Samuelson has explained, 
however, prior to the enactment of the DMCA, United States copyright 
law already satisfied the treaty's requirement of "adequate legal 
protection and effective legal remedies" against circumvention of 
technological measures.85 Even amended as we propose, the DMCA's 
anti-circumvention measures still would go well beyond what the treaty 
requires. Moreover, the "Agreed Statements" accompanying the treaty 
include a declaration that signatory countries may continue to recognize 
existing limitations and exceptions to copyright, including fair use, as 
appropriate in the digital environment and also may create new 
exceptions and limitations as appropriate.86 This intepretative provision 
eA-pressly contemplates the continued viability of fair use under the 
treaty. Our proposal simply would implement the contemplated fair use 
84. As of this writing, the WIPO Copyright Treaty has not entered into force. We 
expect that it will do so soon, however, since the promulgation of the E.U. Copyright 
Directive clears the way for ratification and adoption of implementing legislation by the 
E.U. member countries. See World Intellectual Property Organization: Copyright 
Treaty, December 20, 1996, art. 2l(iii), 36 I.LM 65 [hereinafter WIPO Copyright 
Treaty] (providing that the treaty will bind the European Community upon deposit of 
an instrument of ratification by the Community). 
85. See id. art. 11; Samuelson, supra note 40, at 530--32. Protections already 
established within U.S. law included the doctrines of contributory infringement and 
vicarious liability, as well as additional, special-purpose protections against circumven-
tion, such as the rule proluoiting descrambJing of satellite transmissions, 47 U.S.C. § 605 
(1994 & Supp. V 1999), and the serial copy management requirements of the Audio 
Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994). Both of the latter provisions are far 
less restrictive of user conduct than the combination of rights management systems and 
legal protection under the DMCA 
86. See Agreed Statement Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 
available at http://www.wipo.orgfengfdiplconfldistno/96dc.htrn (last visited Oct 1, 
2001). 
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norm - and would do so in a way that largely preserves the ample anti-
circumvention protections that Congress created. 
We turn next to consideration of the key escrow proposal in light 
of the older Berne Convention, which the WIPO treaty was intended to 
update. Under Article 5(2) of Berne, "[t]he enjoyment and the exercise 
of [copyright] shall not be subject to any formality."87 We consider it 
unlikely that the fair use infrastructure proposed here would run afoul 
of this requirement. To understand why, it is important to distinguish 
conditions on copyright protection from conditions on anti-
circumvention protection and to consider the two halves of our 
proposal separately. 
With respect to our proposal for a first tier of fair use guarantees 
embodied in programrried defaults, we believe that a rule conditioning 
copyright enforcement for United States works on the adoption of such 
defaults clearly comports with the requirements of Berne. The proposal 
is patterned on section 411 of the current Copyright Act, which 
provides that the copyright in a work of United States origin cannot be 
enforced in court until the work 4as been registered.8s Subjecting 
United States works to more stringent standards than those applied to 
foreign works does not violate treaty obligations. Moreover, we think 
that copyright owners of foreign works would have some incentive to 
comply with these standards because doing so would reduce the 
number of users seeking to obtain fair use keys under the key escrow 
system. 
The key escrow system we propose here, in contrast to our 
programmed default proposal, would set conditions only on anti-
circumvention protection. This provision is patterned after two other 
provisions of the U.S. Copyright Act. Under section 412, if a work of 
any nationality is not registered promptly after creation, the copyright 
owner forfeits any future right to statutory damages or attorneys' 
fees. s9 Under section 405, although notice is no longer a requirement 
for copyright protection, failure to place a copyright notice on a work 
may allow defendants to raise an "innocent infringer" defense to 
87. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 
1971, art. 5(2), S. TREATY DoC. No. 99-27 (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 273 [hereinafter 
Berne Convention]. 
88. See 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1999) (requiring registration of copyright as a 
prerequisite for an infringement action for United States works). 
89. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1994) (prohibiting awards of statutOI)' damages or 
attorneys' fees for infiingement occurring after publication but before registration, 
unless registration is made within three months after first publication). 
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monetary liability in an enforcement action.9O Like these provisions, our 
proposal affects remedies rather than rights; unlike them, it does not 
even affect infringement remedies. The deposit requirement is not 
addressed to the work, nor to the copyright in the work, but only to the 
rights management system protecting a work. Deposit would be 
required only for the copyright holder to enjoy statutory anti-
circumvention protection. Even absent a deposit, the copyright holder 
still would be fully protected by copyright law against unauthorized 
copying if the work's rights management system is circumvented. 
Copyright owners wiII enjoy all the rights required under the Berne 
Convention whether or not they choose to take advantage of the 
opportunity for special statutory anti-circumvention protection. 
With regard to anti-circumvention protection proper, the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty provides in Article 3 that the treaty "shall apply 
mutatis mutandis the provisions of Articles 2 to 6 of the Berne 
Convention in respect of the protection provided for in the Treaty."91" 
This article could be read to apply the Berne Convention's no-
formalities provision to the requirement for "adequate legal protection" 
of technical measures. But, as we have noted previously, the United 
States already offered such protection prior to the passage of the 
DMCA. The modifications we suggest here affect only the statutory 
protection offered by the DMCA, and not the doctrine of contributory 
infringement or the other preexisting protections, all of which would 
continue to be cognizable Without deposit or other formality. 
Consequently, we view this portion of our proposal as a legitimate and 
entirely defensible effort to balance two sets of obligations that must 
both be honored: the United States' obligations under the Berne 
Convention and the constitutional policies underlying fair use. 
In addition to the matter of formalities, we must consider whether 
our proposal for programmed fair use defaults plus key escrow 
comports with the United States' substantive obligations under the 
Berne Convention and its related obligations under TRIPS.92 This 
analysis is complicated by the incorporation of the Berne Convention 
within TRIPs; to analyze TRIPs, one must both consider the Berne 
90. See 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1999) (exempting from infringement liability innocent 
infringers who prove reliance on lack of notice). 
91. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 84, art. 3. 
92. See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex Ie, 
33I.LM. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]. 
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Convention requirements within TRIPs and the separate requirements 
of TRIPs proper.93 
The Berne Convention subjects exceptions to the copyright owner's 
exclusive right of reproduction to a three-part test: exceptions may 
apply "in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does 
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author."94 The 
TRIPs agreement incorporates this requirement and extends it to cover 
limitations or exceptions to any of the exclusive rights of a copyright 
owner.9S Several scholars have noted the potential for incompatibility 
between this language and the American doctrine of fair use.96 To be 
sure, both the Berne Convention and TRIPs proper contain a number of 
exceptions and limitations, for news reporting, research, and other 
activities, that may well cover many applications of fair use. However, 
the fair use doctrine potentially applies more broadly to many other 
unauthorized uses that are not enumerated in the treaties and could well 
be perceived as conflicting with both normal exploitation of a work and 
with the author's legitimate interests. 
A dispute resolution panel of the World Trade Organization, which 
administers the TRIPs Agreement, recently ruled that a different 
exception provided in the U.S. Copyright Act violated the TRIPs three-
part test. The panel ruled that section 110(5), a recently enacted 
provision that permits certain small business owners to play radio and 
television broadcasts without remitting an (additional) royalty to the 
copyright owner, conflicted with normal exploitation of the works and 
prejudiced the legitimate interests of the rights holders.97 Observers 
93. See id. part II, § 1, art. 9(1). 
94. Berne Convention, supra note 87, art. 9(2). 
95 .. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 92, art. 13. 
96. See, e.g., Neil W. Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty on TRIPS Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L 441 (1997); Ruth Okediji, 
Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L 75 (2000); 
Marshall Leaffer, The Uncertain Future of Fair Use in a Global Information 
Marketplace, 62 Orno ST. LJ. 849 (2001). Other U.S. limitations and exceptions to 
copyright owners' rights pose similar problems. See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Paying 
the Piper, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L 231 (1999) (discnssing the blanket exception 
allowing small business owners to play radio programming added to § 110(5) of the 
Copyright Act in 1998 by the Fairness in Music Licensing Act); Laurence R. Helfer, 
World Music on a U.S. Stage: A BernelTRIPS and Economic Analysis of the Fairness 
in Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L REv. 93 (2000) (same). 
97. Report of the Panel, United States - Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, 
WTIDS1601R (June 15, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Oct 1, 
2001). 
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have speculated that the fair use doctrine would not survive a similar 
challenge.98 
Fair use, however, is different than section 110(5) in two important 
ways. First, the fair use doctrine expressly incorporates many of the 
same concerns as the BemefTRIPs three-part test A court applying the 
doctrine must consider "the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work," and cases applying the doctrine 
to new copying and distribution technologies make clear that this 
consideration is not an empty one.99 Arguably, the fair use doctrine 
simply provides the means by which the United States applies "the 
BemeffRlPs three-part test to exceptions allowed under its own law. 
Second, fair use is different than section 11 0(5) precisely because it has 
such a wide range of application. Assuming that specific applications 
of fair use might be perceived to violate the BemeffRlPs three-part test, 
the doctrine taken as a whole could not possibly do so - indeed, as 
noted above, the doctrine taken as a whole enables many uses that the 
BemeffRlPs framework expressly pennits.100 
Other language in TRIPs lends support to this conclusion. In 
particular, as Professor Okediji reminds us, Article 7 states that 
protection of intellectual property should be designed to "the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a 
manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of 
rights and obligations."IOI As we have described above, fair use is 
designed to accommodate precisely such a social balance, and our ". 
proposal is designed to preserve that balance. 
98. See Okediji, supra note 96; Leaffer, supra note 96; see also Tyler G. Newby, 
What's Fair Here is Not Fair Everywhere: Does the American Fair Use Doctrine Violate 
International Copyright Law?, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1633, 1648-50 (1999). 
99. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); see. e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th 
Cir. 2001); Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 
(6th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1156 (1997); Am. Geophysical Union 
v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994); Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, 56 
u.S.P.Q.2d 1862 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
100. In this context, it is noteworthy that the wro Panel did not disturb the older 
''homesty1e'' provisions of section 110(5) that permit small business owners to play 
broadcasts "on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes." 
17 U.S.C. § 11 0(5)(a) (1999); see also Report of the Panel, United States - Sections 
301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WfIDSI52IR (Dec. 22, 1999), available at 
http://www.wto.org (last visited Nov. 1,2001) ("Conformity can be ensured in different 
ways in different legal systems. It is the end result that counts, not the manner in which 
it is achieved. Only by understanding and respecting the specificities of each member's 
legal system, can a correct evaluation of conformity be established. ''). 
. 101. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 92, art 7; see Okediji, supra note 96. 
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In addition, Article 40 specifically acknowledges that "some 
licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property 
rights ... restrain competition" and "may have adverse effects on trade 
and may impede the transfer and dissemination of technology."102 
Article 40(2) authorizes member states to enact legislation regulating 
"licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute 
an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on 
competition in the relevant market." 103 Specific examples of competitive 
restraints that states may individually address include "conditions 
preventing challenges to validity and coercive package licensing."I04 
In the context of digital rights management, we must consider as 
an initial matter whether the language of Article 40 may be applied to 
technological restraints on access to or use of intellectual property. We 
think that it may. As we have noted above, by instantiating tenns that 
otherwise might be conveyed by written licenses, technological controls 
will in many instances constitute the equivalent of such licenses and 
thus also constitute a "licensing practice or condition" that is covered 
by the TRIPs language. Even if .the controls are not themselves 
considered to be the equivalent of licenses, they frequently will be 
accompanied by written licenses and so again would constitute a 
"licensing practice or condition." 
Article 40 appears primarily directed toward particularized 
regulation of unfair competition, including anticompetitive practices that 
in the United States are considered matters for antitrust law. Within the 
U.S. copyright system, however, fair use plays an essential role in 
mediating between proprietary rights and unfair competition 
concerns. lOS To take just one example, as discussed above, courts have 
recognized fair use as a legal vehicle to ensure access to copyrighted 
computer programs for purposes of reverse engineering to create 
interoperable or competing products.l06 Although the DMCA includes 
a provision allowing circumvention of rights management systems for 
reverse engineering purposes, the provision is quite narrow and does 
not cover the range of reverse engineering activities that would be 
legitimate under current judicial formulations of fair use. 107 Additionally, 
102. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 92, art 40(1). 
103. Id. art. 40(2). 
104. Id. 
105. See Anticircumvention Misuse, supra note 1. 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41. 
107. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (1999); Julie E. Cohen, WIPO Treaty Implementation 
in the United States: Will Fair Use Survive?, 21 EUR. INTEIL. PROP. REv. 236, 239 
(1999). 
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software sbrinkwrap licenses now routinely include provisions that 
purport to require surrender of a purchaser's fair use reverse 
engineering rights as a condition of access to the program. These 
technological and contractual restrictions surely constitute a condition 
"impeding transfer and dissemination of technology." The system 
proposed here is permissibly directed toward remedying this problem. 
Finally, regardless of its fit with specific provisions of the Berne 
Convention and TRIPs, fair use might be viewed under principles of 
international law as an area of reserved sovereignty under the treaty. 
Under general principles of public international law, nations may, under 
certain circumstances, reserve to themselves sovereign authority over 
some treaty-related matters. lOS Neither the Berne Convention nor TRIPs 
was considered by Congress to be self-executing, and the application 
of each to the United States was limited to that in the implementing 
legislation for each treaty.l09 In neither case has the United States' 
implementing legislation altered fair use - nor, to the extent that fair" 
use is a constitutional priilciple, could it do so. Thus, the implementing 
legislation could be viewed as an attempt to reserve matters relating to 
fair use to the sovereign control of the United States. 
This view of fair use as an area of reserved sovereignty is 
complicated by Berne Convention provisions stating that ratification of 
or accession to the Convention constitutes acceptance of all of its 
requirements unless the ratifying country expressly declares its 
reservations at the time of accession. lIo The United States did not 
expressly declare any reservations when it deposited its instrument of 
ratification, and arguably the Berne Convention would not permit 
derogation from the three-part test.111 Yet clearly the United States did 
not accept all of the Berne Convention requirements upon accession, 
and this position has been largely accepted by other signatory nations. 
Here again we agree with Professor Okediji that the silence of other 
signatories should be deemed to indicate their acquiescence under 
intemationa1law.1I2 The international community was well aware of 
108. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 
1969, art. 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; Okediji, supra note 96, at 144-48 (discussing rules 
governing reservation of sovereignty and their application in the context of interna-
tional copyright law). 
109. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L No. 103-465, 108 Stat 4809 
(1994); Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L No. 100-568, 102 Stat 2853 
(1988). 
1 10. See Berne Convention, supra note 87, art 30. 
111. See Okediji, supra note 96, at 146. 
112. See id. at 121, 147-48. 
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American fair use and of the U.S. approach to the Berne Convention. 
After more than a decade of U.S. reliance upon their acquiescence, 
other signatories to the treaties cannot now complain about a doctrine 
that they were willing to overlook. 
With regard to anti-circumvention protection proper, TRIPs 
imposes no requirement of anti-circumvention protection at all. The 
anti-circumvention provisions of the WIPO Copyright Treaty were 
drafted three years after TRIPs was opened for signature. By its own 
terms, the WIPO Copyright Treaty "shall not have any connection .vith 
treaties other than the Berne Convention, nor shall it prejudice any rights 
and obligations under any other treaty.,,1\3 Thus, TRIPs is at worst 
silent on the question of circumvention and arguably amenable to the 
policy and practices that the proposal would further. 
We conclude that a statute such as we propose, accommodating 
fair use, should lie within the permissible range oflegislation under the 
BerneffRIPs framework. The proposed fair use infrastructure does not 
violate any treaty obligations concerning the protection of copyrighted 
works, and it arguably advances other treaty goals. . Thus, neither 
technology nor law stands as an obstacle to implementation of the 
proposed fair use infrastructure. We turn, finally, to consideration of 
whether other factors might do so. 
V1. COUNTERARGUMENTS 
(OR, THE RISKS OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING) 
Here, we step back and consider whether our proposal for a mixed 
rights management infrastructure is wise. We have argued that 
legislative action can alter the direction of technological change. This 
proposal may make things better - think, for example, of federal 
regulations mandating first seatbelts and later air bags in passenger 
cars _.- but it can also make them worse. For example, ·the 
congressionally mandated adoption of "wiretap ready" telephone 
switching equipment has led to weakened protection for many 
important attributes of private communications.1I4 The DMCA itself is 
a sobering example of an ill-conceived legislative decision to favor one 
technological trajectory over others. Legislative changes also may 
113. In fact, it appears that the WIPO Copyright Treaty will not automatica1Iy bind 
all signatories to the Berne Convention, but only those nations that actually ratify the 
new treaty. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 84, art. 21. 
114. See Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes After the 
Digital Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L REv. 949 (1996); see also 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (1994). 
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trigger undesirable technological responses that Congress did not intend 
or foresee. Larry Lessig, for example, has persuasively argued that the 
development of anti-pornography filterware that permits targeted 
censorship is a technological development far worse than the cyber-
zoning legislation it was designed to forestall. lls Might our proposal 
have a similar effect? Are our proposed changes more like airbags, or 
more like "censorware"? Is our insistence on the possibility of 
productive congressional action naive? As Jessica Litman reminds us, 
copyright-related legislation has repeatedly proved itself especially 
vulnerable to capture by special interests.1I6 Might a different sort of 
legal response to copyright management systems be better? 
Our proposal for a mixed fair use infrastructure is inferior to 
traditional fair use rights in two respects. First, it would not foster the 
full degree of spontaneity enjoyed by fair users' in non-digital media. 
Even a well-designed set of automatic defaults will not permit every use 
that a court might deem fair. Even a streamlined futernet-based 
procedure for obtaining keys will inhibit spontaneity and will impose 
transaction costs that users of non-digital media need not incur.1I7 
Realistically, too, there will be server outages and other technical 
difficulties that prevent fair users from obtaining keys. 
Second, and more important, the proposal in its second-best 
incarnation protects privacy, not anonymity. Traditional fair users have 
enjoyed both. There is no central (or distributed) database containing 
their names and contact information. We suspect that many who rely 
on fair use to produce and distribute their own information goods -
academic works of critical commentary, software created through 
reverse engineering, and the like - do not desire anonymity in the long 
run. Yet anonymity is an indispensable facilitator for other, less 
"official" types of criticism and other types of exploration. Many social 
critics and dissenters function outside the ivory tower and cannot 
invoke norms of intellectual inquiry to deflect the scorn directed at them 
by their communities.IIS Furthermore, arguing that anonymity is the 
115. See Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 629 
(1998). 
116. See Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L 
REv. 19 (1996); Litman, Exclusive Right, supra note 49; Jessica Litman, Copyright 
Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L REv. 275 (1989). 
117. As one supporter of rights management bas argued, however, users of nondigital 
works incur other sorts of transaction costs. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: 
Tlze Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 
N.C. L REv. 557 (1998). 
118. See Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: Tlze Tension 
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special province of "pirates" rather than legitimate fair users seems akin 
to arguing that wiretaps do not threaten innocents who have nothing to 
hide. In our view, both arguments are equally specious. Thus, we 
think that for our "second-best" system to be tenable, the privacy 
protections for fair users who access escrowed keys must be 
extraordinarily robust. Indeed, we wish to stress that this paper should 
not be construed as support for any version of our proposal that 
incorporates weaker privacy protection. I 19 
In sum, the proposal is a second-best solution designed to make the 
best of a bad situation. Rights management systems threaten to destroy 
fair use of digital materials, and to eliminate spontaneity and anonymity 
for would-be fair users and for readers generally. Our proposal accepts 
that these systems will be implemented and strives to minimize their ill 
effects on socially-valued uses. This characterization, however, raises 
the question whether we, too, are taking rights management systems as 
a given and thereby foreclosing a better solution to the problem of 
preserving fair use in the digital environment. 
What might another solution look like? First, the Copyright Office 
might use its rulemaking authority under the DMCA to establish a set of 
exemptions to the ban on circumvention of rights management 
technologies that preserves the traditional spectrum of fair uses. 120 
Based on the results of the first such rulemaking proceeding, we think 
this result unlikely.121 Instead, the Copyright Office has interpreted the 
Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L REv. 1, 59-71 
(1991). 
119. Adoption of the proposal also should not foreclose other measures to preserve 
anonymity. As we have noted, a key escrow system for fair use beyond that allowed by 
the programmed defaults would not preclude individuals who elect to hack copyright 
management systems from raising constitutional defenses to a lawsuit or prosecution 
under the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions. In addition, it is worth repeating 
that anonymity and privacy are concerns not only of fair users, but also of users 
generally. See Read Anonymously, supra note 1. Fashioning anonymity and privacy 
protections for readers in the era of digital rights management is a subject beyond the 
scope of this paper. That said, Congress could and should direct that copyright 
management systems be designed, insofar as possible, to honor anonymous payment 
systems. 
120. See Exemption to Prolul>ition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection 
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 64 Fed. Reg. 66,139 (proposed Nov. -24, 
1999); U.S. Copyright Office, Rulemaldng on Exemptions from Prohibition on 
Circumvention of Technological Measures that Control Access to Copyrighted Works, 
available at http://www.loc.gov/copyrightlI20Ilanticirc.htrul (last visited Oct 2, 2001)_ 
121. See Exemption to Prolul>ition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection 
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,564-66 (2000) 
(codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201.40) (establishing exemptions for literary works whose 
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scope of the DMCA's grant of rulemaking authority as narrowly as 
possible. III But even if the Copyright Office were to declare meaningful 
exemptions to the ban on circumvention, the separate statutory ban on 
the manufacture and distribution of circumvention technologies would 
render the exemptions meaningless and would necessitate a court 
challenge to the statute itself.l23 
Next, following such a challenge, a court might declare the 
DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions unconstitutional in their present 
form. Afterward, individuals seeking to make fair use of protected 
works would enjoy a right to hack the protective technologies without 
fear of civil suit or criminal prosecution. As a result, protection-
defeating technologies would become more readily available and simpler 
to use. Our proposal expressly provides for this result, of course, but 
it is likely that the availability of the programmed-default and key-
escrow alternatives for fair use would decrease the incentives to mount 
such a challenge.124 
We note, first, that the DMCA's early airings in the federal district 
courts do not inspire faith in these predictions.l2S Assuming, however, 
that the courts of appeal show more backbone, we think that under a 
fair use regime defined by constitutional litigation, individuals seeking 
access to encrypted or otherwise protected digital works still will enjoy 
materially less fair use, and less spontaneity and anonymity in fair use, 
than they do now. Although a court might (and, in our view, ~hould) 
declare the anti-circumvention provisions facially invalid, a far likelier 
result is that decisions as to constitutionality would be made on a 
access control mechanisms have malfunctioned or become obsolete and for lists of 
websites blocked by digital censorware). 
122. See id. at 64,559-60. 
123. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(I)(E) (1999) (stating that exemptions to ban on act 
of circumvention shall not serve as defenses to other provisions); id. § 1201(a)(2), (b) 
(1999) (proluoiting the manufacture, diStribution, or importation of circumvention 
technologies). 
124. The legal regime we propose also might be more likely to survive constitutional 
challenge, since it would be considerably less restrictive than the current regime. 
125. See Microsystems Software, Inc. v. Scandinavia Online AB, 98 F. Supp. 2d 74 
(D. Mass. 2000); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), appeal pending sub nom. Universal City Studios v. Corley, No. 00-
9185 (2d Cir.). It is posSlole that Felten v. Recording Industry Ass'n of Am, Inc., No. 
CV-01-2660 (GEB) (D.NJ.), will prove a better vehicle for constitutional cballenges to 
the DMCA. Felten and his co-plaintiffs, researchers in computer science at Princeton 
University, seek declaratory and injunctive relief prolubiting enforcement of the 
DMCA's anti-device provisions to prevent them from discussing and publishing their 
research findings on the efficacy of certain anti-circumvention technologies. 
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piecemeal, as-applied basis.126 Thus, the threat of prosecution or suit 
under the DMCA will continue to chill many lawful fair use activities. 
Even facial invalidation of anti-circumvention legislation, moreover, will 
not prevent private publishers from implementing rights management 
systems. Congress might do so, of course, but we think it 
inconceivable that Congress would pass such a law. Even the most 
user-friendly circumvention technologies will require some threshold 
level of technological competence. 
There remains, finally, the question whether successful court 
challenges to the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions might create 
incentives for content owners to design their systems more flexibly, to 
accommodate a degree of spontaneous, anonymous fair use. For 
example, the prospect of costly litigation of repeated constitutional 
challenges might provide incentive to implement steganography 
(watennarkingtechnology) that could allow the proliferation of a certain 
digital work to be traced back to particular distribution points or copies, 
or even to particular users. 127 Conceivably, this might move copyright 
holders toward steganography alone as a method of deterring digital 
piracy. 
We think, though, that a system of mandatory programmed fair use 
minima plus key escrow probably would create even stronger incentives 
for more flexible design. Most obviously, our proposal would require 
a minimum degree of system flexibility as a condition of state-backed 
copyright enforcement. Although private ordering has become 
increasingly central to copyright enforcement strategies, the copyright 
industries continue to view a degree of state-backed enforcement as 
essential. 128 Particularly when compared with the uncertainties of 
constitutional litigation, we think that our proposal is more likely to 
encourage the development of a "lex informatica" that serves all of the 
126. Cf. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 332-39 (rejecting defendants' as-applied 
challenge to the DMCA's ban on circumvention devices and refusing even to consider 
their facial overbreadth challenge). 
127. See NIl WHITE PAPER, supra note 45, at 188-89; KemJeth W. Dam. Self-Help 
in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1999); Rosemarie F. Jones, Wet 
Footprints? Digital Watermarks: A Trail to the Copyright Infringer on the Internet, 26 
PEPP.L REv. 559, 569 (1999). 
128. Imposing the "carrots" of mandatory fair use minima and key escrow might of 
course diminish the preference for state enforcement. Cj. Tom W. Bell, Escape from 
Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expressive Works 
(working paper Mar. 29, 2000) (on file with authors) (arguing that copyright law should 
enable authors to opt out of the statutory scheme of protection). However, our faith 
in the ingenuity of backers is such that we do not think a system of pure private 
ordering would be in the copyright industries' best interests. 
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interests underlying the copyright system, including the public interest 
in fair use. 
In addition, we cannot unqualifiedly endorse steganography as the 
magic solution to the problem of fair use under digital rights 
management. Although a system of steganography-based rights 
management could support spontaneous fair use of digital materials 
more fully than would a proliferation of "lock-out" systems and fair use 
preauthorization requirements, a system that attempted to register 
unique copies to identified users would destroy anonymity for fair 
users, and indeed for all readers. Although we think that steganography 
offers certain advantages over other forms of rights management -
and that a steganography-based system need not be designed to 
compromise anonymity (or privacy) - we think that the legitimacy of 
such a system would depend on the specific details· of its 
implementation. 
Returning, finally, to the example of filterware, it seems highly 
likely that the market would have developed filterware whether or not 
Congress had passed legislation zoning Internet pornography. We 
cannot say the same for our proposal, and we think this is one of its 
strengths. Where copyright management systems are concerned, the 
market drives· inexorably toward ever-less-flexible controls - or, 
rather, for controls that are flexibly responsive to the business plans of 
rights-holders, not the desires and habitual practices of fair users. A 
move toward greater flexibility will require some other impetus. We 
think that our proposal could provide this impetus. At the least, we 
hope that it will encourage greater discussion of the possibilities. 
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